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BEYOND TRANSPARENCY: POLICE UNION
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND
PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY
Walter Katz*

ABSTRACT
Police unions rose in power partially in response to the civil unrest in
urban neighborhoods in the 1960s. As unions gained political power, critics argue that they have frequently stood as obstacles to accountability-related reforms. One vehicle of the exercise of such power is through
collective bargaining agreements negotiated between unions and public
bodies representing cities and counties. Contracts that civilian policymakers negotiate with police unions shield officers from accountability for misconduct and excessive force. Through a lack of political will, expediency,
and a lack of public transparency during negotiations, civilian leaders
agree to contracts that, for example, erect obstacles to the filing of complaints, enact artificial time limits on investigations, and make it difficult
for the public to have insight in whether and how officers are disciplined.
The impact on poor Black, Brown and Indigenous communities can be
profound. The members of such communities already face more aggressive
policing yet are also distanced from the negotiations and political processes
that shape labor agreements that shape those practices. Community members from such environments are deeply distrustful of not only law enforcement, but also government. Labor contracts negotiated by policymakers
which shield officers from being held accountable for actions taken during
the very exercise of the more aggressive policing visible in poorer communities do so at the cost of the marginalized public’s well-being. This paper
proposes that members of low-income communities that experience high
crime and over-policing have a meaningful role in a police union bargaining process that actively foments dialogue and participation. The aim could
be brought about by narrowing the scope of bargaining, adopting steps to
render the negotiation process more transparent, or by creating mechanisms that require the participation of community members in negotiations.
More research is needed to test these potential solutions in these areas of
participatory democracy and labor negotiations.

* Walter Katz, Vice President of Criminal Justice, at Arnold Ventures LLC. The
views expressed are his own.
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I. INTRODUCTION

I

N January of 2021, a union president representing officers of a Montgomery County, Maryland police department proclaimed in a letter
to a newspaper that
nowhere in county collective bargaining law does it say that a third
party or the County Council need to be able to decipher all collective
bargaining documents. They are legal documents and should be understood by the parties who are subject to them—in this case, the
county executive (the employer) and the Fraternal Order of Police
(the employee representatives).1

The statement was in response to a report issued by the Montgomery
County Office of Legislative Oversight, which sought to describe “the
terms and conditions of the County Government’s collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) with County police officers.”2 The authors concluded it
was “impossible” for a third party to understand all of the provisions of
the contract “between the County and FOP Lodge 35,” let alone which
primary documents, side letters, and memoranda of agreements served as
the basis of the parties’ understanding.3
If another government agency cannot discern the terms of a police labor contract, how could the public be expected to do so? The perspective
that the public—or even another government agency—has no need to
understand a contract between a public employer and its law enforcement officers is not unique to suburban Maryland. Over the past forty
1. Torrie Cooke, Opinion: County Report on Police Contract Missed the Mark on
Transparency, Tasers, BETHESDA MAG. (Jan. 30, 2021, 3:53 AM), https://bethesdamagazine.com/bethesda-beat/opinion/opinion-county-report-on-police-contract-missed-themark-on-transparency-tasers [https://perma.cc/47TN-QV25].
2. LESLIE RUBIN & ARON TROMBKA, OFF. LEGIS. OVERSIGHT, LABOR AGREEMENTS
WITH MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE OFFICERS: OLO REPORT 2021-1 ii (2021), https://
montgomerycountymd.gov/OLO/Resources/Files/2021_Reports/OLOReport2021-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RP2U-ZM2D].
3. Id. at 11.
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years, the power of police unions has “surged,”4 and it is not a coincidence that the ascendence of police labor organizations closely followed
protests for civil rights for Black people in the 1960s.5
The latest crisis in policing, catalyzed by the 2020 police killings of
George Floyd in Minneapolis and Breonna Taylor in Louisville, has also
brought needed attention to deeply entrenched aspects of American society that have relegated Black Americans, especially poor Black Americans, to conditions of inequity and substantially reduced opportunity for
empowerment and economic advancement.6 That separation is enforced
by a criminal justice system that has too often relied on tough-on-crime
strategies and over-enforcement tactics, while simultaneously failing to
keep residents in these same neighborhoods safe from crime.7
This moment, unfortunately, is not a new one. Less than a decade ago,
the names of Michael Brown, Eric Garner, and Sandra Bland were spurring the calls for police reform.8 Like in 2020, those high-profile deaths of
Black people led not only to protests but also to government-led convenings, as well as new policies, training, and equipment intended to increase
accountability, decrease use of force, and reduce inequities in the criminal justice system.9 However, those efforts did not explore the relationship between police unions and local government officials in erecting and
maintaining barriers to police reforms.10 Only recently has the role of
police unions and collective bargaining started to receive academic attention.11 For example, one commentator has noted that “[i]n the past, participants in this conversation have not fully recognized the ways that
4. Ayesha Bell Hardaway, Time is Not on Our Side: Why Specious Claims of Collective Bargaining Rights Should Not Be Allowed to Delay Police Reform Efforts, 15 STAN. J.
C.R. & C.L. 137, 197 (2019).
5. See id. at 170–71 (“The tumultuous relations between African Americans and police officers in major cities during the mid-to-late 1960s provided a new opportunity for
officers to organize and to leverage their power while seeking better wages and fair
treatment.”).
6. See, e.g., Colleen Walsh, Solving Racial Disparities in Policing, HARV. GAZETTE
(Feb. 23, 2021), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2021/02/solving-racial-disparities-inpolicing [https://perma.cc/GW9Y-YRGT].
7. See Benjamin Levin, What’s Wrong with Police Unions?, 120 COLUM. L. REV.
1333, 1349 (2020).
8. See Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126
YALE L.J. 2054, 2058 (2017); Linda Poon & Marie Patino, CityLab University: A Timeline
of U.S. Police Protests, BLOOMBERG (June 9, 2020, 12:39 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2020-06-09/a-history-of-protests-against-police-brutality [https://perma.cc/
7B9U-73RW].
9. See generally, e.g., PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING (2015), https://
cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/9L9C-C2J8].
10. For example, the Final Report of The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing mentions police unions only a handful of times. See id. at 35 (suggesting that law enforcement agencies create an advisory group to include “union representatives” to assess
new technologies); id. at 61 (focusing on partnerships with “unions” to support officers’
safety and wellness); id. at 85–86 (calling on “[u]nion leadership” to partner with agency
leadership to incorporate procedural justice into the internal discipline process).
11. Christopher Harris & Matthew M. Sweeney, Police Union Contracts: An Analysis
of Large Cities, POLICING: J. POL’Y & PRAC. 1–2 (June 25, 2019), https://doi.org/10.1093/
police/paz042 [https://perma.cc/6A8S-DB29]; Levin, supra note 7, at 1336.
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police labor and employment law may contribute to questionable internal
disciplinary measures.”12 For that matter, policymakers have avoided critiquing their own role in giving police unions the power to define not only
the extent of accountability measures but also the methods through which
their members police neighborhoods with large populations of Black,
Brown, or poor people.13
This Article overlays the environment of marginalized communities
with the rise of police union power and the manifestation of that power in
collective bargaining agreements. The public, especially the portion that
is most impacted by policing practices, is locked out of the negotiation
process and relies on elected officials to look out for its interests in having
an accountable police force that treats members in predominantly racial
minority neighborhoods fairly.
While the expressed ethos of American democracy is grounded in the
twin pillars of “transparency” and “accountability,”14 the police union
collective bargaining process undermines both. Part I of this Article describes the theory of “legal estrangement” developed by Yale Law School
professor Monica Bell15 and how the theory explains the inaccessibility to
political power following the uprising of the 1960s and the ensuing backlash that helped give rise to police union power. Part II examines the
relationship between police unions and race, and whether the attitudes of
largely white-led police unions dominate the legal and policy positions
taken by unions on accountability-related terms of labor agreements. Part
III explores how police collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) hinder
accountability reforms where policymakers have insufficiently looked out
for the interests of the part of the public that most directly encounters
aggressive policing but has the least political power. Part IV describes the
purported value of government transparency; examines how public employee collective bargaining is, for the most part, exempt from open government rules; and argues that transparency without meaningful access to
the negotiating process is ineffectual in the context of local contract bargaining. Finally, Part V uses the goal of social inclusion as a framework
for participatory democracy reforms to increase the access of the public
to the negotiation process.
This Article is not a call to dismantle public employee unions. The right
of public employees to advocate and bargain for their pay, benefits, and
work conditions is grounded in the understanding that public employ12. Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 DUKE L.J. 1191, 1241 (2017).
13. See Levin, supra note 7, at 1399 (“Currently, unions stand guard over [the] structures [of modern policing], but so too do the elected officials who capitulate to union demands and sacrifice community will on the altar of political expediency. Reducing these
problems to a critique of union power would effectively let politicians off the hook . . . .”).
14. Jennifer Shkabatur, Transparency With(out) Accountability: Open Government in
the United States, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 79, 83 (2012) (“Public accountability has been
inseparably linked to transparency; and transparency is routinely regarded as a necessary
precondition of accountability.”).
15. See generally Bell, supra note 8, at 2100–26.
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ment is a property interest.16 The role of union leaders is to protect the
interests of their members, and they do so very well. This Article posits
that reform efforts should focus on elected officials who have acquiesced
in moving what are political questions that should involve open debate
into closed-door negotiations. While it is important to protect the interests of workers, government officials have an obligation “to ensure that
the constitutional protections guaranteed to all individuals do not take a
back seat.”17 The lack of meaningful public accessibility to the negotiation process has contributed to officials agreeing to police labor contracts
that undermine accountability and run counter to the interests of residents who are already estranged from the political process.
II. LEGAL ESTRANGEMENT AND THE EXCLUSION FROM
POLITICAL POWER
Understanding the roots of carceral strategies and policies is vital to
understanding the relationship between members of under-resourced
communities that are subjected to aggressive policing, primarily those
with Black or Brown populations. That condition has led to deep distrust
of policing and, according to legal scholars, a crisis in legitimacy that undermines efforts to keep communities safe because residents “are less
likely to obey officers’ commands or assist with investigations.”18 The
model that a decrease in trust due to police behavior undermines the legitimacy of policing, which in turn leads to decreased individual compliance and cooperation, is at the heart of what is known as “procedurally
just policing.”19 Professor Bell forcefully and effectively argues that if an
observer steps back and sees a broader horizon, a more complex picture
emerges:
[T]he full body of research on race and trust is one of profound
marginalization, a social diminishment that—while not encapsulating
the fullness of the African American experience—indicates that poor
African Americans as a whole tend to have a social experience distinctive from those of other ethnic and class groups in the United
States. Structural disadvantage yields a broader cultural structure of
mistrust. Most discussions of African American distrust of the police
only skirt the edges of a deeper well of estrangement between poor
communities of color and the law—and, in turn, society.20
16. See Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song Richardson, Police Unions, 85 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 712, 718 (2017) (“As government employees, police have constitutional due process
rights if, as a matter of state or local law or practice, they have an expectation of continued
employment sufficient to create a property interest in the job.” (citing Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 540–41 (1985); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 343–44
(1976); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602–03 (1972))).
17. Hardaway, supra note 4, at 197.
18. Bell, supra note 8, at 2058.
19. Id. at 2077; see Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule
of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 294–95 (2003).
20. Bell, supra note 8, at 2072.
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An examination of policing in marginalized neighborhoods over the
past fifty years reveals that the very notion of what is assumed in the
goals of criminal justice needs re-examination. It cannot be assumed that
better results in policing are about getting the trust-legitimacy-compliance sequence right, because that is built on a norm that “the community
(including victims) is on the side of policing or prosecution.”21 This begs
the question whether distrust in such communities is too deep to make
such an assumption. Understanding how policing, as the most visible face
of the state, has contributed to that distrust is essential.
Political scientists Soss and Weaver use the term “race–class subjugated
(RCS) communities” to describe overpoliced Black and Brown communities in order to “call attention to the interweaving of race and class relations, especially as they concern . . . the activities of governing institutions
and officials that exercise social control by means of coercion, containment, repression, surveillance, regulation, predation, discipline, and
violence.”22
Police officers began to organize in the late nineteenth century.23 The
goals of organization at the time were primarily economic, primarily lying
in securing pensions and insurance programs and improving hours.24 By
1919, police unions had organized in large cities “to improve working
conditions and increase compensation.”25 After the First World War, a
number of police unions went on strike.26 In Boston, the ensuing absence
of a police presence led to several days of rioting and looting.27 The striking officers were fired, but the episode led to hostility toward police
unions.28
The mid-1960s saw upheaval and uprisings by Black people in cities
across the United States in response to police violence.29 In the aftermath
21. Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of “the People” in Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM.
L. REV. 249, 278 (2019).
22. Joe Soss & Vesla Weaver, Police Are Our Government: Politics, Political Science,
and the Policing of Race–Class Subjugated Communities, 20 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 565, 567
(2017).
23. See JAMEIN CUNNINGHAM, DONNA FEIR & ROB GILLEZEAU, OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RIGHTS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER’S BILL
OF RIGHTS 2 (2020) http://craftmediabucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/LEOBR_Cunning
ham_12_3_20.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NC8-PP2H].
24. Id.
25. Id.; see also id. (“Police officers rarely got raises, typically had to purchase their
uniforms, and were subjected to long work hours. For example, police officers in Boston
worked between 73 to 91 hours per week and were required to spend one night per week
at the station.” (citations omitted)).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Clyde Haberman, The 1968 Kerner Commission Report Still Echoes Across
America, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/23/us/kerner-commission-report.html [https://perma.cc/N9YJ-DAQA]. Protests included the New York
neighborhoods of Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant in 1964, Watts in Los Angeles in 1965,
and Cleveland in 1966. Id. “Then came the disastrous summer of 1967,” in which “[c]haos
enveloped more than 160 American cities and towns, the most ruinous riots leading to 43
deaths in Detroit and 26 in Newark.” Id.
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of the civil unrest, the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders,
better known as the Kerner Commission, issued its report in 1968 identifying that many Black Americans led lives of economic exclusion and
segregation, and it equated the police with “white power, white racism,
and white repression.”30 The commission made recommendations regarding employment, education, welfare, housing, and policing.31
Unfortunately, the Kerner Commission report did not usher in an economic renaissance or a new era of egalitarian policing for Black communities. In fact, the incidents of civil unrest were seen by political elites and
white citizens as signs of entrenched disorder for which a heavy-handed
response by policymakers and police was the prescription:
In the decades between the Kerner Commission report and the
DOJ’s [Department of Justice’s] Ferguson report, government authorities refashioned the policing of RCS communities. . . . [A]fter
years of stagnant budgets and little growth, “law and order” political
agendas put new muscle behind policing operations throughout the
nation. Local police agencies received a powerful influx of federal
resources (alongside rising subnational investments) and became the
target of new federal agendas and modes of administrative support.
Federal financial resources underwrote new policing initiatives
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, many of which were promoted and
guided by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
(LEAA).32
Such federal grant programs have had few restrictions on how they
could be spent.33 As federal spending on policing increased, local policymakers have steadily increased police budgets over the past forty years.34
Along with more spending, they obtained greater authority to impose
“law and order” tactics such as “capacities to stop, arrest, detain, investigate, and deploy force.”35 In adopting new concepts such as “broken windows,” police aggressively enforced civil-order and quality-of-life
offenses.36 “In contrast to middle-class white communities, police in RCS
communities visually and dramatically asserted control of the
30. Bell, supra note 8, at 2069 (quoting NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORREPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 5 (1968)).
31. Key Kerner Commission Recommendations, OTHERING & BELONGING INST. UNIV.
CAL., BERKELEY, https://belonging.berkeley.edu/key-kerner-commission-recommendations#policing [https://perma.cc/QA2G-8N7M] (organizing the Kerner Report’s recommendations regarding policing into five categories: (1) ”change in police operations in the
ghetto to ensure proper conduct by individual officers and to eliminate abrasive practices”;
(2) ”more adequate police protection of ghetto residents, to eliminate the high sense of
insecurity”; (3) ”effective mechanisms for resolving citizens’ grievances against the police”;
(4) ”policy guidelines to assist police in areas where police conduct can create tension”;
(5) and the “develop[ment] [of] community support for law enforcement”).
32. Soss & Weaver, supra note 22, at 569 (citations omitted).
33. Id. at 570.
34. Emily Badger & Quoctrung Bui, Cities Grew Safer. Police Budgets Kept Growing.,
N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/06/12/upshot/citiesgrew-safer-police-budgets-kept-growing.html [https://perma.cc/9EGA-X2KD].
35. Soss & Weaver, supra note 22, at 570.
36. Id.
DERS,
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streets . . . .”37 The impacts of the aggressive tactics on criminal justice
were profound:
On virtually every measure one could conceive, from arrest rates to
use of force, the authority and reach of policing expanded. In New
York City, for example, police stops of pedestrians increased from
90,000 to just under 700,000 between 2002 and 2011; low-level summonses expanded from 160,000 in the early 1990s to 650,000 in 2005;
and since 2002, New York City police have made 350,000 misdemeanor arrests for small amounts of marijuana. The Big Apple was
not alone. Cities across the country adopted tougher stances in policing and made greater use of vertical patrols and surveillance in public housing, trespass arrests, gang injunctions, loitering ordinances,
and Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) deployments.38
As police are often the most visible face of the state in high-poverty
neighborhoods, they are looked to for a multitude of services and protection because there is a deficit of other services. But police are simultaneously the locus of residents’ ire over the prevalent role of state power in
their lives.39 Bell describes what follows from these conditions as a legal
estrangement, or “‘anomie’ about law” that is “more than distrust.”40 She
continues, “[I]t is a sense that the very fabric of the social world is in
chaos—a sense of social estrangement, meaninglessness, and powerlessness, often a result of structural instability and social change. It is a sense
founded on legal and institutional exclusion and liminality.”41 Legal estrangement is not a product of a person’s involvement in illegal behavior;
rather, it is a product of the everyday encounters experienced by individuals and their relatives, friends, and neighbors at the hands of government systems that consistently dehumanize people living in high-poverty
Black communities, thus leaving them “structurally ostracized through
law’s ideals and priorities.”42 Put another way,
A combined municipal–state–federal legal architecture permits routine police violence by granting police discretion over when and how
to arrest or deploy force in a wide variety of settings. This discretion
allows police to target poor, Black, and brown people. Police violence effectively becomes justified force at various stages: when internal affairs dismisses a civilian complaint as insignificant, when a
prosecutor refuses to file charges against the police, when a grand
jury refuses to indict, and when the use of force is deemed reasona37. Id. at 573.
38. Id. at 571 (citations omitted).
39. See id. at 574–75.
40. Bell, supra note 8, at 2084 (citing Robert J. Sampson & Dawn Jeglum Bartusch,
Legal Cynicism and (Subcultural?) Tolerance of Deviance: The Neighborhood Context of
Racial Differences, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 777, 778 (1998)).
41. Id. at 2084–85 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 2085 n.123 (describing “liminality”
as “a state of being in-between, not fully inside a particular institution or cultural milieu,
but not fully detached from it”).
42. Id. at 2086; see JESSE JANNETTA, JEREMY TRAVIS & EVELYN MCCOY, US P’SHIP
ON MOBILITY FROM POVERTY, PARTICIPATORY JUSTICE 2 (2018), https://www.mobility
partnership.org/file/1218816/download?token=C1cK2B4j [https://perma.cc/KMA6-VXU2].
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ble and therefore justified in either a criminal or civil process. Qualified immunity provides police an almost insurmountable defense
against civil rights claims. Police union contracts protect police
power and insulate police violence from review and consequence.
Moreover, indemnification practices mean that police do not pay an
actual dime of any civil damage awards—local governments do.43
Bell posits that “legal estrangement is a product of three socio-legal
processes: procedural injustice, vicarious marginalization, and structural
exclusion.”44 This Article will focus on how this third process, structural
exclusion, relates to police union contract negotiations. In the context of
police services, residents of high-poverty neighborhoods see that they are
“lock[ed] . . . out of the benefits of law enforcement,” in a condition of
being “harshly policed yet underprotected.”45 However, “Structural exclusion often occurs in ways that community members do not recognize,”
as they withdraw from, or never enter, civic discourse.46
The broad discretion that officers have falls disproportionately on
members of the very marginalized communities that “are not in a position
to make things politically difficult.”47 In fact, “Most discussions of African American distrust of the police only skirt the edges of a deeper well
of estrangement between poor communities of color and the law—and, in
turn, society” as well as political participation.48 That discussion must include an acknowledgement of the roots of modern policing that occurred
simultaneous to the law-and-order movement that began in the late
1960s.
III. POLICE UNIONS AND ATTITUDES ABOUT RACE
About two-thirds of police officers are members of labor organizations.49 Prior to the 1960s, police officers faced significant obstacles in
organizing, partially due to general hostility toward public-employee labor organizing and from the legacy of police officers striking in the early
twentieth century.50 Police organizers saw the tensions between police officers and Black Americans calling for their civil rights as “a new oppor43. Amna A. Akbar, An Abolitionist Horizon for (Police) Reform, 108 CALIF. L. REV.
1781, 1791–92 (2020) (footnotes omitted).
44. Bell, supra note 8, at 2100.
45. Id. at 2115.
46. Id. at 2116.
47. Maria Ponomarenko, Rethinking Police Rulemaking, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 28
(2019). An analysis of City of Chicago civilian complaint data found that requiring complainants to travel to the oversight office to sign an affidavit attesting to the accuracy of the
complaint decreases the likelihood of a signature the farther the office is from one’s neighborhood. Bocar A. Ba, How Far Are You Willing to Go Against the Police? Evaluating the
Effects of Citizen Affidavits in Chicago 2 (Sept. 26, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2897063 [https://perma.cc/3AV9-LHRV]. The effect is more pronounced for Black
residents who reside in a neighborhood that is demographically dissimilar from the neighborhood of the oversight office, thus preventing political and administrative principals
from effectively governing law enforcement officers. See id. at 2–3.
48. Bell, supra note 8, at 2072.
49. Harris & Sweeney, supra note 11, at 2.
50. See Hardaway, supra note 4, at 170.
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tunity for officers to organize and to leverage their power while seeking
better wages and fair treatment.”51 Their efforts paid off with new state
laws providing police officers and other municipal employees the right to
collectively bargain.52 Today, five states (Georgia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia) still prohibit police officers from collective bargaining.53
Police unions have since become a “significant component of the . . .
criminal system.”54 Police unions have used their political power to resist
efforts such as the creation of civilian review boards and disclosure of
discipline records.55 Part of their success is through successful framing of
reform proposals and criticism of excessive force as “tantamount to abetting ‘gun-toting criminals,’ which oversight is implicitly linked to violent
crime rates. The voice of the union, then, is one that brooks no compromise and is open to no critique.”56 For example, in the 1960s, the union
for officers of the New York Police Department ran advertisements that
played into the fear of violence to counter calls for a complaint review
board; one such advertisement “showed a young middle-class white woman emerging from the subway onto a darkened street, looking frightened, with an accompanying text that read, ‘The Civilian Review Board
51. Id. at 170–71.
52. Id. at 171; Kevin M. Keenan & Samuel Walker, An Impediment to Police Accountability? An Analysis of Statutory Law Enforcement Officers’ Bills of Rights, 14 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 185, 196 (2005).
53. MILLA SANES & JOHN SCHMITT, CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RSCH., REGULATION
OF PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE STATES 4 (2014), https://cepr.net/
documents/state-public-cb-2014-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/6C7H-58YG]; Marcia L. McCormick, Our Uneasiness with Police Unions: Power and Voice for the Powerful?, 35 ST. LOUIS
U. PUB. L. REV. 47, 53–54 (2015) (explaining that in states that prohibit unionizing, police
associations provide legal or advocacy assistance).
54. Levin, supra note 7, at 1337; see Jorge L. Ortiz, ‘The Major Stumbling Block’: Powerful Police Unions Stand in the Way of Structural Reform, Experts Say, USA TODAY (June
12, 2020, 2:18 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/06/12/george-floydpolice-unions-stand-way-reform-experts-say/5347136002 [https://perma.cc/XWX5-EY2D].
55. Harris & Sweeney, supra note 11, at 2; see, e.g., Uriel J. Garcia, Viral Police Video
May Be Tipping Point for Phoenix to Create Citizen Review Board for Use-of-Force Cases,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC (July 3, 2019, 5:18 PM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/phoenix/2019/07/03/phoenix-police-unions-oppose-creating-a-citizen-oversight-board-use-offorce-viral-video/1628581001 [https://perma.cc/H73Q-N9VH]; Jessica Anderson, ACLU
Challenges FOP Lawsuit Attempting to Limit Civilian Review Board Access to Files, BALT.
SUN (July 14, 2016, 8:08 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/baltimore-city/bsmd-ci-fop-civilian-review-board-suit-20160714-story.html [https://perma.cc/AVR2-WG4W];
Noam Scheiber, Farah Stockman & J. David Goodman, How Police Unions Became Such
Powerful Opponents to Reform Efforts, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/06/06/us/police-unions-minneapolis-kroll.html [https://perma.cc/
G32F-NAXZ]; Daniel Oates, Opinion: I Used to Be a Police Chief. This Is Why It’s So
Hard to Fire Bad Cops., WASH. POST (June 12, 2020, 6:30 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/12/i-used-be-police-chief-this-is-why-its-sohard-fire-bad-cops [https://perma.cc/D8E2-D5BE].
56. Levin, supra note 7, at 1351; see also Fisk & Richardson, supra note 16, at 756–58
(describing perception that recently elected Seattle mayor was acceding to union leadership wishes by “demoting and forcing out individuals who were working with the DOJ to
institute reforms,” which thereby “created fear, silenced more progressive voices amongst
the rank-and-file, and made them reluctant to engage in reform-oriented efforts”).
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must be stopped! Her life . . . your life . . . may depend on it.’”57
The rise of unions against the backdrop of community demands for
non-discriminatory and humane policing during the civil rights era
unfortunately resulted in the continuation of diametrically opposed
interests between the government employers and their employee
groups. This is demonstrated by continued efforts by law enforcement organizations to prevent community involvement in accountability practices, such as civilian oversight.58
This positioning against robust accountability that emerges from the
Civil Rights Movement is reflected in studies of officer attitudes and behavior today. A Pew survey of nearly 8,000 police officers in 2016 found
that many officers questioned the sincerity of protesters criticizing policing and were “deeply skeptical of the motives of the demonstrators who
protested after many of the deadly encounters between police and
blacks.”59 Pew found that Black and white officers have starkly different
ideas over the motivations for protests over policing.60 White officers and
Black officers also see overall race relations very differently, given that
“virtually all white officers (92%) but only 29% of their black colleagues
say that the country has made the changes needed to assure equal rights
for blacks.”61
White and Hispanic officers were more likely to respond that police
had a positive relationship with racial or ethnic minorities in their communities than were Black officers.62 However, 56% of officers “feel that
in some neighborhoods being aggressive is more effective than being
courteous.”63
57. William Finnegan, How Police Unions Fight Reform, NEW YORKER (July 27,
2020), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/08/03/how-police-unions-fight-reform
[https://perma.cc/67GR-PHH3].
58. Hardaway, supra note 4, at 172–73 (footnote omitted).
59. RICH MORIN, KIM PARKER, RENEE STEPLER & ANDREW MERCHER, PEW RSCH.
CTR., BEHIND THE BADGE 17 (2017), https://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/
sites/3/2017/01/06171402/Police-Report_FINAL_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/CJ9H-SDWC]
(reporting that 92% of officers believe that bias against the police is a “great deal (68%) or
some (24%) of the motivation behind demonstrations,” whereas “only about a third (35%)
of officers say in a separate question that a genuine desire to hold officers accountable for
their actions is at least some of the motivation for the protests”).
60. See id. at 6 (“When considered together, the frequency and sheer size of the differences between the views of black and white officers mark one of the singular findings of
this survey. For example, only about a quarter of all white officers (27%) but seven-in-ten
of their black colleagues (69%) say the protests that followed fatal encounters between
police and black citizens have been motivated at least to some extent by a genuine desire
to hold police accountable.”).
61. Id. at 6; see also id. at 6–7 (“Not only do the views of white officers differ from
those of their black colleagues, but they stand far apart from those of whites overall: 57%
of all white adults say no more changes are needed, as measured in the Center’s survey of
the general public.”).
62. Id. at 16 (“A consistently smaller share of black officers than their white or Hispanic colleagues say the police have a positive relationship with minorities in the community they serve. Roughly a third of all black officers (32%) characterize relations with
blacks in their community as either excellent or good, while majorities of white and Hispanic officers (60% for both) offer a positive assessment.”).
63. Id. at 18.

430

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

The Pew findings in 2016 align with an earlier Police Foundation survey
of a nationwide sample of police officers.64 Nearly 12% of white officers
“agreed or strongly agreed that police officers often treat whites better
than they treat blacks and other minorities.”65 In contrast, “more than
half (51.3 percent) of the black officers agreed or strongly agreed” with
the sentiment about disparate treatment.66
The Police Foundation survey uncovered a divide between racial subgroups of officers over perceptions of the unequal use of force against
civilians based on race:
The divergence between the views of black officers and those of
other officers was even more pronounced on the question of whether
police officers are more likely to use physical force against blacks
and other minorities than against whites in similar situations. Although only 1 in 20 (5.1 percent) white officers in the sample believed that blacks and other minorities received such unequal
treatment, well over half of the black officers surveyed (57.1 percent)
thought that police officers were more likely to use physical force
against blacks and other minorities than against whites in similar
situations.67
A study published in 2021 by economists examined officer behavior in
Chicago using census and city administrative data and found racial distinctions in officer conduct—including in stops, searches, and use of
force—in a pattern paralleling the attitudes reflected in the surveys.68
By their nature, unions are majoritarian institutions and their elected
leadership can wield enormous political power.69 Even in police departments where the majority of officers are people of color, union leadership
is frequently white.70 The result is that politically powerful police unions
take stances that can significantly diverge from the preferences of politically and socially isolated “residents in heavily policed communities,” as
64. See DAVID WEISBURD & ROSANN GREENSPAN, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., U.S. DEP’T
JUST., NCJ NO. 181312, POLICE ATTITUDES TOWARD ABUSE OF AUTHORITY: FINDINGS
FROM A NATIONAL STUDY 8 (2000), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181312.pdf [https://
perma.cc/TMW9-8JJC].
65. Id.
66. Id. In a survey of residents of high-crime, low-income neighborhoods in six U.S.
cities, 55.5% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with a similar sentiment, that “police officers will treat you differently because of your race/ethnicity.” NANCY LA VIGNE,
JOCELYN FONTAINE & ANAMIKA DWIVEDI, URB. INST. JUST. POL’Y CTR., HOW DO PEOPLE IN HIGH-CRIME, LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES VIEW THE POLICE? 9 (2017).
67. WEISBURD & GREENSPAN, supra note 64, at 9.
68. Bocar A. Ba, Dean Knox, Jonathan Mummolo & Roman Rivera, The Role of Officer Race and Gender in Police-Civilian Interactions in Chicago, 371 SCI. 696, 696 (2021)
(“Relative to white officers, Black and Hispanic officers make far fewer stops and arrests,
and they use force less often, especially against Black civilians. These effects are largest in
majority-Black areas of Chicago and stem from reduced focus on enforcing low-level offenses, with greatest impact on Black civilians.”).
69. Fisk & Richardson, supra note 16, at 756.
70. Eli Hager & Weihua Li, A Major Obstacle to Police Reform: The Whiteness of
Their Union Bosses, MARSHALL PROJECT (June 10, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://
www.themarshallproject.org/2020/06/10/a-major-obstacle-to-police-reform-the-whitenessof-their-union-bosses [https://perma.cc/APC4-7SMW].
OF
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well as from some officers in their own ranks.71 Police unions—and the
contracts they negotiate—can “operate as markers or structural guarantors of obstruction and unaccountable policing, particularly as they affect
communities of color, poor people, and other marginalized groups.”72
IV. USING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING TO UNDERMINE
ACCOUNTABILITY
Collective bargaining is the process between employee representatives
and management in which the two sides are obligated to negotiate in
good faith to reach a mutually agreeable binding contract over the wages,
benefits, and work conditions of that employee group.73 State and local
public employees are not entitled to collective bargaining under the federal National Labor Relations Act.74 Instead, the question of whether
non-federal public-sector employees can join a labor organization for the
purposes of collective bargaining is a matter of state law.75
How work conditions are defined, and which matters are subject to
mandatory bargaining (versus permissive or prohibited subjects), is also a
matter of state law.76 The focus of this Article, however, is on police contract collective bargaining over discipline.77
If the parties reach a tentative agreement, the members vote whether
to ratify the agreement. On the management side, negotiated agreements
71. Ponomarenko, supra note 47, at 55–56; see also Erik Ortiz, ‘Embrace the Change’:
Some Black Officers Sidestep Unions to Support Police Reform, NBC NEWS (June 15, 2020,
1:01 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/embrace-change-some-black-officerssidestep-unions-support-police-reform-n1231024 [https://perma.cc/4HN2-9776] (“But in
cities like St. Louis, Miami and New York, some of the calls for significant reform are
coming from another place: within police departments themselves, among smaller pockets
of officers who don’t necessarily feel heard by their police unions or the department brass,
which are largely white.”).
72. Levin, supra note 7, at 1343.
73. See, e.g., Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/7 (2021) (prescribing mutual obligation on part of employer and employee representatives “to negotiate
in good faith with respect to wage, hours, and other conditions of employment”); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (West 2021) (“[T]he public employer shall meet at reasonable
times and negotiate in good faith with respect to grievances, disciplinary disputes, and
other terms and conditions of employment.”).
74. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (“The term ‘employer’ includes any person acting as an agent of
an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include . . . any State or political subdivision thereof . . . .”).
75. See Smith v. Ark. State Hwy. Emps., 441 U.S. 463, 464 (1979) (per curiam).
76. A “mandatory subject” is one that “settle[s] an aspect of the relationship between
the employer and the employees.” Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am., Loc. Union
No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971).
In narrowly interpreting what the New Jersey Employer–Employee Relations Act meant
by “terms and conditions of employment,” and thus subject to mandatory bargaining, the
New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that “the very foundation of representative democracy would be endangered if decisions on significant matters of government policy were
left to the process of collective negotiation, where citizen participation is precluded.”
Ridgefield Park Educ. Ass’n v. Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 393 A.2d 278, 287 (N.J.
1978). Four years later the legislature amended the Act to expressly include negotiations
over grievances and discipline within conditions of employment. Act of July 30, 1982, ch.
103, 1982 N.J. Laws 544–46.
77. See Harris & Sweeney, supra note 11, at 2; Hardaway, supra note 4, at 173.

432

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

are ratified by the political body, typically a city council or county commission. If an agreement is not reached—that is, an impasse is declared
on mandatory subjects—then state law describes the process that follows,
such as interest arbitration.78 Unilateral changes to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment require the employer to meet
and confer with union representatives.
For advocates of police reform, the primary point of contention with
police collective bargaining is not wages or hours worked but rather the
conditions and terms that are attached to disciplinary and accountability
procedures. The four primary pillars of “accountability-related” policies
and procedures are:
(1) policies and procedures designed to ensure that police officers
obey the law and, also, policies on treating citizens in a lawful, respectful, and unbiased manner; (2) policies and procedures ensuring
that incidents of alleged misconduct are properly reported and then
investigated thoroughly and fairly; (3) policies and procedures ensuring that proven incidents of misconduct result in appropriate discipline; and (4) policies and procedures ensuring that police
departments take proactive steps to prevent officer misconduct in
the future.79
Such reform-minded objectives frequently run into the terms negotiated during collective bargaining.80 Union negotiators bargain for terms
that “limit the employer’s ability to monitor and manage the misconduct
of officers”; these terms “go[ ] far beyond merely ensuring that disciplinary processes are fair, timely, and impartial.”81
An analysis of forty-seven police union contracts among the 100 largest
departments explored contract terms that “might impede the effective investigation or misconduct or militate against police accountability more
generally.”82 The authors found several ways in which the contracts undermined accountability. For example, “[S]ix (15.4%) contracts allow[ed]
for the officer to know the name of the complainant prior to an interrogation . . . .”83 More than a quarter of contracts (25.6%) specified time
limits so that if a complaint were lodged after the negotiated deadline, an
78. For example, the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act provides:
The parties may, by mutual agreement, provide for arbitration of impasses
resulting from their inability to agree upon wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment to be included in a collective bargaining agreement.
Such arbitration provisions shall be subject to the Illinois “Uniform Arbitration Act” unless agreed by the parties.
5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/7 (2021).
79. Samuel Walker, Institutionalizing Police Accountability Reforms: The Problem of
Making Police Reforms Endure, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 57, 59 (2012).
80. See Rushin, supra note 12, at 1205–06.
81. Hardaway, supra note 4, at 173.
82. Harris & Sweeney, supra note 11, at 4. None of the forty-seven contracts was from
a police department situated in a state that had a law enforcement officer’s bill of rights
(LEOBoR). Id.
83. Id. at 6.
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officer could not be disciplined.84 Seven contracts excluded or restricted
the investigation of complaints filed anonymously.85 Four contracts between the officer employees and their employer specified penalties for
filing “false complaints.”86 Such practices discourage the public from filing complaints and thus make it more difficult for the employer to identify whether an officer is abusing citizens.87 Twenty-two contracts (56.4%)
required waiting periods before investigators could interview an officer
who is the subject of an investigation.88
Another study examined 178 police union contracts covering about
40% of municipal officers in states that permit or require collective bargaining in police departments.89 The study assessed whether the terms of
these contracts “unreasonably interfere with or otherwise limit the effectiveness of mechanisms designed to hold police officers accountable for
their actions.”90 Rushin identified seven types of “problematic” contract
provisions that recurred throughout the dataset; in particular, these included provisions that (1) delay interviews of officers suspected of misconduct; (2) provide officers with access to evidence before interviews
about alleged wrongdoing; (3) limit consideration of discipline history; (4)
limit length of an investigation or establish a statute of limitations; (5)
limit anonymous complaints; (6) limit civilian oversight; and (7) permit or
require arbitration for the imposition of discipline.91 Rushin found that
156 of 178 contracts had “at least one provision that could thwart legitimate disciplinary actions.”92 On average, three provisions that potentially
thwart accountability appeared in contracts in the twenty-five largest cities in the United States.93 Five contracts had at least five problematic
terms.94
Whether collective bargaining is the cause of “overly protective inter84. Id. Time limits ranged from as few as forty-five days to 1,095 days. Id. For allegations filed after the time limit, a complaint could still be investigated, but the findings
would not result in discipline. Id. Some contracts, however, contained exceptions for complaints alleging criminal conduct. Id.
85. Id.; see also id. at 10 (“Citizens who are the victims of police brutality or coercion
in particular likely would fear retribution and therefore may be uncomfortable providing
their names to police, and so forbidding anonymous complaints likely discourages information provided by these victims.”).
86. Id. at 6.
87. See id.
88. Id. at 7; see also id. (“While police personnel justify formal waiting periods on the
grounds that officers need time to obtain representation, critics often view waiting periods
as a time during which officers can collude to create similar accounts that will withstand
interrogation and ultimately exculpate themselves.”).
89. Rushin, supra note 12, at 1198.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1220.
92. Id. at 1224.
93. See id. at 1222–23.
94. See id. The five cities with at least five of seven problematic provisions at the time
of the study were Austin, Texas; Columbus, Ohio; Portland, Oregon; San Antonio, Texas;
and Washington, D.C. See id.
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nal disciplinary procedures” is still an open question.95 Even without collective bargaining, it is plausible that police officer associations could
persuade policymakers to adopt such procedures.96
The role of police unions—in both contract negotiations and the political realm—has historically been oppositional to critics and reform efforts
while simultaneously embracing “tough on crime” strategies.97 Police officer unions have resisted a range of measures that are seemingly within
the realm of management, but which have a measurable influence on police operations and community interactions.98 One such example occurs
when officers resist oversight:
When collective bargaining gives line officers more authority to define the police role, officers embrace a legalistic patrol style that results in higher arrests and more aggressive criminal enforcement.
The power-shifting effect of collective bargaining is, to a great extent, apparently inconsistent with the hierarchical “chain of command” structure that police agencies adopt. The resulting friction
adversely affects officer performance.99
The other actors in police union bargaining—management and elected
officials—have been insufficiently scrutinized.100 This is so perhaps because “[o]fficers and their unions are a potent political force, which may
make chiefs reluctant to adopt guidelines or policies that officers will oppose.”101 Political leaders are also “likely to face demands by police officer unions for additional compensation or benefits to offset the [noneconomic] changes” to a contract.102
Government leaders, however, have an obligation to protect the interests of their residents by exercising their role as manager of police
employees:
The existence of public sector collective bargaining rights does not
diminish state obligations to manage and direct safety forces. Indeed,
the state maintains an affirmative duty to properly train, supervise,
and manage its police forces. And while the police union leadership
supports and advocates for the interests of its members, the local
government is obligated to protect the rights and interests of their
95. Stephen Rushin & Allison Garnett, State Labor Law and Federal Police Reform,
51 GA. L. REV. 1209, 1219 (2017). For example, Rushin concluded that his analysis of
CBAs in Police Union Contracts “does not show a causal relationship between the use of
collective bargaining and the implementation of questionable disciplinary procedures,” but
“[n]evertheless, this Article’s findings are consistent with the hypothesis that police labor
law can frustrate accountability efforts, thereby limiting the effectiveness of traditional,
cost-raising forms of police regulation.” Rushin, supra note 12, at 1241.
96. Rushin & Garnett, supra note 95, at 1219.
97. See Fisk & Richardson, supra note 16, at 744–45.
98. See Harris & Sweeney, supra note 11, at 2; Rushin, supra note 12, at 1205; Hardaway, supra note 4, at 162.
99. Seth W. Stoughton, The Incidental Regulation of Policing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2179,
2216–17 (2014).
100. See Levin, supra note 7, at 1366.
101. Ponomarenko, supra note 47, at 28–29.
102. Rushin & Garnett, supra note 95, at 1220.
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constituents. It is a managerial function of government to set the policies and procedures of their police departments.103
Political leaders should be balancing the interests of various stakeholders.
Instead, “political leaders on both sides of the aisle who once rejected
police unionization as a threat to public safety have now widely embraced
it.”104 The picture that has emerged is that of local government policymakers succumbing to regulatory capture—that is, the “regulatory entity
responsible for protecting the public interest instead advances the interests of the entity it was tasked with regulating.”105
Unions and city leaders also agree to wage and benefit concessions in
exchange for weakened discipline policies and procedures.106 By design,
there is “minimal community input”;107 the public has no idea what is
going on during negotiations. As such, it becomes unclear whom to hold
responsible:
Ignoring management’s place in the bargaining process risks letting
actual elected officials pass the buck and suggests that it is the job of
the union—not the elected officials—to look out for the public interest. (Relatedly, such simplified accounts obscure the fact that government actors might make concessions on CBA provisions relating
to oversight as a means of avoiding police demands regarding wages,
hours, and benefits.)108
It is in this environment of weak regulatory oversight that three out of
four residents of high-crime, low-income communities do not believe that
officers will be held accountable for misconduct.109
Collective bargaining laws have provided police unions the opportunity
to make demands for policy change that were not contemplated by state
legislators.110 The trade-offs that are inherent to bargaining are shaping
accountability rules that allow for the continuation of police practices
that further isolate poor Black people and other racial minorities with
103. Hardaway, supra note 4, at 177–78; see also Rushin, supra note 12, at 1206
(“[C]ourts and state labor relations boards have generally held that managerial prerogatives should not be subject to negotiation as so-called ‘conditions of employment.’ In practice, though, courts have proved fairly deferential to public-employee unions.” (footnote
omitted)).
104. Rushin, supra note 12, at 1206.
105. Id. at 1215 n.117.
106. See id. at 1216.
107. Rushin & Garnett, supra note 95, at 1217.
108. Levin, supra note 7, at 1366–67 (footnote omitted).
109. In a survey of residents of high-crime, low-income neighborhoods in six U.S. cities,
only 24.4% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that “[t]he police department holds
officers accountable for wrong or inappropriate conduct in the community.” LA VIGNE,
supra note 66, at 10.
110. See Stoughton, supra note 99, at 2195–96 (“The fact that the incidental regulation
of policing avoids the deliberative process that safeguards societal interest-balancing
makes policing-neutral laws a particular concern. These laws create the status quo, defining
the police role in society and shaping the practices that implicate policing’s unique functional and expressive role in society.”).
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little public scrutiny.111 The scope of collective bargaining should be limited in order to keep police unions from having the power to set policy at
the expense of less-powerful competing groups.112
However, what if it is not simply a matter of public employers exercising their managerial prerogative and removing policy matters from the
scope of what is negotiable?113 The officials generally possess
the tools to prevent countermajoritarian policy outcomes in bargaining, just as they do in legislation or rulemaking. But public officials
can also choose not to use these tools—or fail to use them effectively. In other words, conflicts between public sector collective bargaining agreements and public preferences are best attributed not to
the bargaining process but rather to the conduct of actors in that
process . . . .114
V. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND TRANSPARENCY
Is “a dearth of transparency” the distinct flaw of police union collective
bargaining?115 Because negotiations are shrouded in secrecy, there is a
risk that the negotiated contract will not accord with “majority preferences.”116 In this view, the negotiation process runs counter to the democratic process by giving one special interest—police officers—a venue
where they can influence public policy that excludes other “competing
interest groups.”117 The counterargument is that a confidential negotiation “provides a forum for rational discussion and accommodation of
competing interests.”118 Closed negotiations allow for a weighing of the
advantages and disadvantages of alternative options and for a robust
back-and-forth on the issues to reach an agreement.119 Elected officials
have the final say on whether to ratify a negotiated labor contract, thus
offering an opportunity for an exchange of ideas and vocalized criticism
(or support) by the public. However, the very way in which elected officials ratify contracts makes it difficult for the public to engage in any
111. See id. at 2216–17 (identifying the power-shifting effect where collective bargaining
creates the environment for unions to advance aggressive enforcement measures through
weak accountability policies).
112. See, e.g., Hardaway, supra note 4, at 181; In re City of Concord, 651 A.2d 944, 946
(N.H. 1994).
113. See Hardaway, supra note 4, at 181.
114. Daniel M. Rosenthal, Public Sector Collective Bargaining, Majoritarianism, and
Reform, 91 OR. L. REV. 673, 706 (2013); see Levin, supra note 7, at 1399 (observing that
local government officials have violated the public’s trust by agreeing to objectionable discipline policies and use-of-force rules).
115. Rosenthal, supra note 114, at 703.
116. Id.
117. Martin H. Malin, Does Public Employee Collective Bargaining Distort Democracy?
A Perspective from the United States, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 277, 279 (2013); see also
Clyde W. Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE L.J.
1156, 1164 (1974) (“When the union presents its demands, the public official or his representative must respond . . . .”).
118. Summers, supra note 117, at 1200.
119. Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 908 (2006).
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meaningful way.120 This lack of legitimate access contributes to “public
apathy and a sense of hopelessness in making any critical judgment of the
agreement.”121
In theory, greater transparency provides “the free flow of information
among public agencies and private individuals, allowing input, review,
and criticism of government action, and thereby increases the quality of
governance.”122 In most states, however, collective bargaining happens
outside of the public view.123 The Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press (RCFP) maintains a compendium of state laws on transparency
and open government, and the database includes statutes related to negotiations and collective bargaining of public employees.124 Each state’s
bargaining transparency rules were reviewed using the RCFP compendium and cross-referenced to a similar compendium published by the
Commonwealth Foundation.125 Using the RCFP database of collective
bargaining rules reveals that eight states that allow for police officers to
collectively bargain also require some degree of transparency (Florida,
Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, Oregon, and Texas).126
120. See Rosenthal, supra note 114, at 703–04 (“The opacity of bargaining therefore
makes it impossible for citizens to engage in the ‘actual exchange of ideas and participation’ that is the ‘cornerstone of democratic decision making.’”).
121. Clyde W. Summers, Public Sector Bargaining: Problems of Governmental Decisionmaking, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 669, 676 (1975); see also Rosenthal, supra note 114, at
709–10 (“While the public understands that legislators are responsible for legislation, when
policy made through bargaining is unpopular, government officials can claim that they
were simply forced to accede to union demands.”).
122. Fenster, supra note 119, at 900.
123. See Rushin, supra note 12, at 1199; PRIYA M. ABRAHAM, COMMONWEALTH
FOUND., OPENING THE CURTAIN ON GOVERNMENT UNIONS 5–8 (2015), http://
www.commonwealthfoundation.org/docLib/20150609_CBTransparency.pdf [https://
perma.cc/T22F-765J] (showing that most states provide only limited transparency into collective bargaining negotiations).
124. Negotiations and Collective Bargaining of Public Employees, REPS. COMM. FOR
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, https://www.rcfp.org/open-government-sections/k-negotiationsand-collective-bargaining-of-public-employees [https://perma.cc/YAX6-T2U9].
125. State Labor Laws, COMMONWEALTH FOUND. (Sept. 16, 2019), https://
www.commonwealthfoundation.org/state_labor_laws [https://perma.cc/WH2B-DGUQ].
126. See FLA. STAT. § 447.605 (2020) (subjecting negotiations to Florida’s public-meeting rules contained in § 286.011 but exempting employer strategy discussions); IDAHO
CODE § 74-206A(1) (2021) (“All negotiations between a governing body and a labor organization shall be in open session and shall be available for the public to attend.”); IOWA
CODE § 20.17.3 (2021) (“Negotiating sessions, strategy meetings of public employers, mediation, and the deliberative process of arbitrators shall be exempt from the provisions of
chapter 21 [open-meetings rules]. However, the employee organization shall present its
initial bargaining position to the public employer at the first bargaining session. The public
employer shall present its initial bargaining position to the employee organization at the
second bargaining session, which shall be held no later than two weeks following the first
bargaining session. Both sessions shall be open to the public and subject to the provisions
of chapter 21.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4319(b)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2021 legislation) (allowing public bodies and agencies subject to open meetings act to go into closed
session “to discuss employer-employee negotiations whether or not in consultation with
the representative or representatives of the public body or agency”); MINN. STAT.
§ 179A.14.3 (2020) (“All negotiations, mediation sessions, and hearings between public
employers and public employees or their respective representatives are public meetings
except when otherwise provided by the commissioner.”); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 9 (“No
person shall be deprived of the right to examine documents or to observe the deliberations
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Even in states where there is a degree of transparency, the terms of the
agreement and its motivations are often inadequately explained; as a result, the public cannot participate in a meaningful way.127 Moreover,
while residents of underserved neighborhoods may not know the intricacies of collective bargaining, they do understand their history and their
lived experience with policing within their own “cultural and social
frames”; thus, their exclusion from meaningful involvement in the collective bargaining process is harmful.128 Sunshine laws requiring transparency tend to fail to achieve the result that is assumed to accrue from
transparency—“an informed, participatory democracy”—because such
laws fail to place disclosure in the proper context and do not “tailor the
time and manner of disclosure” to the needs of that part of the public that
is most likely to benefit from the information.129 There has been very
little scholarship focused on whether sunshine laws are effective in influencing accountability-related contract provisions, or whether the public is
even aware that negotiations are open meetings.130
For communities that are most impacted by aggressive policing, there is
little possibility for meaningful participation when the agenda for that
week’s city council meeting includes ratification of a CBA and an attachment of an already negotiated collective bargaining agreement.131 This is
so because
[o]nce agreement is reached at the bargaining table, many of the issues are largely foreclosed; a heavy presumption arises against rejection of the agreement, even on budgetary grounds. The political
of all public bodies or agencies of state government and its subdivisions, except in cases in
which the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure.”);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-203(1) (2019) (“All meetings of public or governmental bodies . . . must be open to the public.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.660(3) (2019) (“Labor negotiations shall be conducted in open meetings unless negotiators for both sides request that
negotiations be conducted in executive session.”); TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 146.013(a) (West 2019) (“Deliberations relating to a meet and confer agreement or proposed agreement under this chapter between representatives of the public employer and
representatives of the employee association recognized under this chapter as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent for the covered employees must be open to the public and comply with state law.”); id. § 146.013(b) (“Subsection (a) may not be construed to prohibit the
representatives of the public employer or the representatives of the recognized employee
association from conducting private caucuses that are not open to the public during meet
and confer negotiations.”); id. § 174.018 (“A deliberation relating to collective bargaining
between a public employer and an association . . . shall be open to the public and comply
with state law.”).
127. See Shkabatur, supra note 14, at 84.
128. Fenster, supra note 119, at 930.
129. Id. at 934–35.
130. A study on the relationship between sunshine laws and collective bargaining focused on the effects of state sunshine laws on wage outcomes for police officers and
firefighters. Kevin M. O’Brien, The Impact of Sunshine Laws on Police and Firefighter
Bargaining Outcomes, 5 APPLIED FIN. ECON. 425, 425 (1995). The study found “some evidence for lower police compensation,” but ultimately, “sunshine laws never decreased employment, wage bills or department spending.” Id. at 431. “Thus,” the study concluded,
“overall, sunshine laws cannot be considered an effective device for monitoring police and
firefighter bargaining outcomes.” Id.
131. See Fenster, supra note 119, at 934–35.
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officials can be held responsible at the polls, but without some
knowledge of the positions of the parties at the bargaining table the
voter is handicapped in making a judgment. For the political process
to be responsive and reliable, members of the public need to know
the issues being negotiated and have an opportunity to make their
views known before agreement is reached.132
Instead, collective bargaining allows for a closed “two-sided process”—
with other interest groups kept in the dark, often by law, about what is
being deliberated—rather than for a political process with a range of
ideas for consideration and debate.133
The solution to union contracts that leave a portion of a community
further estranged from the public square is not police reform as we traditionally think of “reform,” but rather involves implementing new governance practices that could potentially lead to meaningful public
involvement. It is the recognition that “police reform” must encompass
the role of police, unions, and local government leaders in the criminal
justice system.134
VI. PROPOSALS FOR PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY IN
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
The collective bargaining process has the potential to serve as a major
lever to “shift the rules and practices of law enforcement” so that more of
these are responsive to community priorities.135 The goal is to empower
members of politically isolated, low-income communities that experience
high crime and over-policing so they can have a meaningful role in a police union bargaining process that has historically erected barriers to accountability. Such efforts are built on a theory of change that “legitimacy
can be built through dialogue among equal citizens,” which runs counter
to a traditional view that public involvement in police governance is a
hindrance to managing law enforcement and reducing crime.136 The intent is to go beyond traditional reform efforts that focus on individual
public–police interactions and instead “address deeper structural
problems in municipalities” through the creation of mechanisms for dialogue and participation.137 This intentional approach of inviting the community into accountability matters runs counter to the traditional
perspective (rooted in a narrow view of who constitutes “the public”) that
residents are mainly interested in getting more and better services for
their tax dollars and are not that interested in grievance procedures.138
132. Summers, supra note 117, at 1197.
133. Id. at 1164.
134. See Levin, supra note 7, at 1338–39.
135. Id. at 1346.
136. Bell, supra note 8, at 2075.
137. Monica C. Bell, Anti-Segregation Policing, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 650, 656 (2020); see
also Ponomarenko, supra note 47, at 33 (explaining that an agency is unlikely to put rules
in place that, for example, limit officer discretion to arrest a person in an absence of requirements or incentives to do so).
138. See Summers, supra note 117, at 1183.

440

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

There are three potential pathways to increase community involvement: (1) apply recent refinements of sunshine laws to collective bargaining; (2) broaden the scope of subjects excluded from collective
bargaining, thereby moving those topics into the public venue for consideration; and (3) open the collective bargaining process to public participation. Assessing these proposed options requires an evaluation of whether
each proposal begins to address the deficits in group societal membership
that Black, Brown, and Indigenous people experience in accessing venues
where power is negotiated.139
The first proposal is to strengthen current transparency laws. Under the
Brown Act of California, for example, legislative bodies may hold closed
sessions during negotiations with representatives of employee organizations but are prohibited from taking final action on a negotiated agreement in a closed session.140 One alternative path to allow for public
participation is being tried in California: starting in 2012, a number of
local governments adopted what became known as Civic Openness in Negotiations (COIN) legislation, which requires that the local government
make all contract proposals and supporting documents available both
prior to and after negotiation sessions.141 The provisions generally found
in a COIN ordinance include “hiring an independent lead negotiator to
represent the agency in labor negotiations; hiring an independent auditor
to assess the fiscal impact of each provision of the current labor agreements . . . ; public[ ] disclos[ur]e [of] all proposals, including their fiscal
impact . . . ; and posting tentative agreements and associated costs for
public review.”142 The reporting by the auditor and disclosure of proposals and tentative agreements is meant to increase transparency.143 California localities that have adopted a COIN ordinance include Costa
Mesa, Rancho Palos Verdes, Beverly Hills, Fullerton, and Orange
County.144 Though a promising start, these are relatively wealthy municipalities and have very few Black residents.145 It thus remains to be seen
139. See Bell, supra note 8, at 2131.
140. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 54957.6(a) (Deering 2021).
141. See, e.g., CITY OF NOVATO, CAL., RESPONSE TO THE MARIN COUNTY CIVIL
GRAND JURY REGARDING CIVIC OPENNESS IN NEGOTIATIONS 1 (2015), http://
cms6ftp.visioninternet.com/novato/agendas/pdfstaffreports/cc091515_I-13.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4N6X-6JL2].
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See QuickFacts: Costa Mesa City, California, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://
www.census.gov/quickfacts/costamesacitycalifornia [https://perma.cc/7X52-F927] (11.9%
poverty rate, $84,138 median household income, 1.8% Black population); QuickFacts:
Rancho Palos Verdes City, California, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/fact/table/ranchopalosverdescitycalifornia/PST045219 [https://perma.cc/Y5H63J4A] (4.1% poverty rate, $138,557 median household income, 1.9% Black population);
QuickFacts: Beverly Hills City, California, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/fact/table/beverlyhillscitycalifornia/PST045219 [https://perma.cc/ZGH4-YQ3X]
(8.3% poverty rate, $106,936 median household income, 1.9% Black population);
QuickFacts: Fullerton City, California, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/fact/table/fullertoncitycalifornia/PST045219 [https://perma.cc/T2ZL-KDMY]
(12.3% poverty rate, $79,978 median household income, 2.5% Black population). Califor-
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whether the model sufficiently encourages meaningful participation by
community members who live in under-resourced neighborhoods.
COIN legislation has had a fraught history. The Orange County Employees Association brought a successful claim before the Public Employee Relations Board (PERB) alleging that the county failed to meet
and confer with the union prior to adopting their COIN ordinance and
thus violated the state’s employee relations act.146 In 2015, California enacted Senate Bill 331, which placed additional burdens on cities and
counties that adopted a COIN ordinance.147 The new law, supported by
public employee unions, requires that such cities apply COIN rules to
every contract with a value of at least $250,000 that the city intends to
negotiate.148 As a result of SB 331, cities like Costa Mesa have amended
their collective bargaining ordinances to avoid the state-mandated contracting requirements.149 Research is needed to evaluate whether COIN
ordinances are actually effective in encouraging public participation in
collective bargaining; nonetheless, the cities that have a COIN ordinance
at least seem to be encouraging resident involvement.150 To be effective,
a transparency ordinance should “provide information to citizens and improve their ability to make choices about the services they receive.”151 It
is not clear, though, that simply providing more collective bargaining information earlier, absent an intentional effort to engage estranged populations, will be successful in opening the process to a broader range of
communities.
The second proposal is for states to take steps to democratize collective
bargaining by moving certain provisions out of the realm of collective
nia at large has a 11.8% poverty rate, $75,235 median household income, and a 6.5% Black
population. QuickFacts: California, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/fact/table/CA/PST045219 [https://perma.cc/K2CQ-JB22].
146. Orange Cnty. Emps. Ass’n v. County of Orange, PERB Decision No. 2594-M, at
39 (Nov. 6, 2018), https://perb.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/decision-2594m.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5SLX-9TP5] (finding that Orange County violated California’s Meyers-MiliasBrown Act).
147. S.B. 331, 2015–2016 Reg. Sess., 2d Extraord. Sess., 2015 Cal. Stat. 5384.
148. CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 22178(a) (West 2021).
149. Luke Money, Costa Mesa Council Tosses Coin Ordinance in Favor of New Transparency Policy, DAILY PILOT (Jan. 16, 2019, 5:25 PM), https://www.latimes.com/socal/dailypilot/news/tn-dpt-me-cm-coin-ordinance-20190116-story.html [https://perma.cc/MCQ4Q9ZY].
150. See, e.g., Press Release, Keith Sterling, Pub. Info. Manager, City of Beverly Hills,
City of Beverly Hills Seeks Community Input as Labor Negotiations Set to Begin (Apr. 3,
2019), http://www.beverlyhills.org/cbhfiles/storage/files/1833799503370391696/
LaborCommMeetings4119.pdf [https://perma.cc/NM3J-6WZL].
151. Carolyn Ball, What Is Transparency?, 11 PUB. INTEGRITY 293, 300 (2009). Relatedly, Professor Fenster proposes “a context-specific focus on decisional outputs that considers the value of disclosure to the public, in terms of both the timing and content of the
disclosure, and the cost of disclosure to government, focusing again on timing.” Fenster,
supra note 119, at 941. As he explains, “This approach focuses less on the quantity of
information available than the effects of disclosure on accountability and decision-making.
It assumes that better government information, utilized well both by the state and the
public, will in turn produce better decision-making.” Id.
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bargaining and into the local legislative body for public consideration.152
The State of Illinois took such steps in 2021 when it enacted accountability-related reforms and, in doing so, explicitly removed certain new provisions from collective bargaining.153 Enacted House Bill 3653 prohibits the
requirement that a complainant include a sworn affidavit with a misconduct complaint and applies the ban to any such provision contained in a
CBA.154 In the same bill, the legislature passed new rules regarding the
decertification of an officer’s license for misconduct and similarly prohibited collective bargaining over certification requirements.155 In effect, any
effort to change either the affidavit prohibition or decertification rules
will need to be debated in the legislature rather than in a closed collective
bargaining session.156 The decision that a “subject should be nonbargainable does not mean that policemen have no legitimate interest in whether
their conduct should be subject to public review,” and nothing should
foreclose their participation in a “political process which [is] equally open
to all competing views and interest groups.”157 But police unions are an
organized political force who are comfortable influencing the process in
state houses in ways that people from marginalized communities are not.
It should not be expected that grassroots community advocates will have
the same degree of influence without a similar capacity for organized
action.158
One suggested variation of this model is to have states allow local legislatures to publicly weigh in on subject areas during the negotiation and
explicitly define which permissive bargaining subjects to pursue through
bargaining:
States could first require that local legislatures receive detailed and
regular updates on bargaining, perhaps received by a committee
charged with reporting to the wider legislative body when needed.
With respect to permissive topics, the local legislature should be explicitly empowered by state law to enact binding resolutions that instruct government negotiators to either bargain on a permissive topic
or pull such a topic off the table. Indeed, such votes should be required at the outset of bargaining for significant permissive topics. To
further encourage active legislative oversight, the legislature could
be required to take periodic votes on whether to continue bargaining
152. See Rushin, supra note 12, at 1244; see also Hardaway, supra note 4, at 194
(“Power to create and manage law enforcement agencies rests with the state.”).
153. H.R. 3653, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. sec. 10-150, § 3.8(b), sec. 25-40, § 6.7
(Ill. 2021).
154. Id. sec. 10-150, § 3.8.
155. Id. sec. 25-40, § 6.7 (“Notwithstanding any other law, the certification and decertification procedures, including the conduct of any investigation or hearing, under this Act
are the sole and exclusive procedures for certification as law enforcement officers in Illinois and are not subject to collective bargaining under the Illinois Public Labor Relations
Act or appealable except as set forth herein.”).
156. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/2(c)(2) (2021) (providing that collective bargaining
sessions may be excepted from open-meeting requirements).
157. Summers, supra note 117, at 1197.
158. See Leah Sakala & Nancy La Vigne, Community-Driven Models for Safety and
Justice, 16 DU BOIS REV. 253, 255 (2019).
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on permissive topics.159
Any effort to narrow the scope of bargaining approaches at the local
level will require care, as employers cannot unilaterally move to change
terms of a contract under the claim of managerial prerogative without a
thoughtful analysis of whether the modification violates the requirement
to meet and confer with the union.160 Conversely, promises to shrink
what is bargainable may lead to overly optimistic expectations and may
do little to bring legally estranged community members into the process,
which would continue to be dominated by the will of the legislature.161
The third proposal is for states to open collective bargaining to the
public by amending their employee relations laws to emulate those states
that require open negotiation sessions.162 The work of grassroots organizers in Austin, Texas, provides an example of what is possible when
impacted communities get a seat in the bargaining process.163 In Austin,
“black people represent only 8 percent of the population yet are subjected to 14 percent of stops, 26 percent of searches, 24 percent of arrests
and 31 percent of officer-involved shootings.”164 The Austin Justice Coalition (AJC) launched a strategic campaign in 2016 that had the ultimate
goal of influencing the terms of the collective bargaining agreement to
reflect community needs better than the contract that was being negotiated at the time:
The campaign strategically started during the 2016 budget session so
that demands would interrupt the flow of money into the police department. AJC members attended a rare public hearing on the police
contract and were able to demand their participation in subsequent
weekly hearings throughout 2017, making sure to physically pack
hearing rooms with community members and to take detailed notes
for cross-referencing every change from previous contracts. City
council members stated that AJC’s presence at the hearings helped
them feel more comfortable in dialogue around reforms . . . .165
At the urging of AJC, the Austin city council initially rejected a negoti159. Rosenthal, supra note 114, at 712–13 (footnote omitted).
160. See Long Beach Peace Officer Ass’n. v. City of Long Beach, 203 Cal. Rptr. 494,
505 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (concluding that police officers’ practice of receiving consultation
from an association representative or attorney prior to writing a report concerning an officer-involved shooting was ‘past practice’ not subject to a unilateral change by the police
department).
161. See Hardaway, supra note 4, at 195 n.382 (“There is an assumption that elected
officials represent the viewpoints of their respective communities by sheer virtue of being
duly elected. The belief that civilians should simply use the ballot box as the sole avenue to
express their support or disdain for the acts of local government officials is problematic.”).
162. See Rushin, supra note 12, at 1244.
163. See generally Sukyi McMahon & Chas Moore, Opinion: To Reform the Police,
Target Their Union Contract, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/
08/opinion/austin-police-union-contract.html [https://perma.cc/C4UL-N9T6].
164. Id.
165. KELCEY DUGGAN, CMTY. RES. HUB FOR SAFETY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, RESEARCH MEMO: POLICE UNIONS AND THE OBSTACLES THEY POSE 22 (2020), https://communityresourcehub.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/
2020_FINAL_Unions_Obstacles_Memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MS8-XPDG].
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ated agreement.166 AJC then directly influenced the renewed negotiations.167 The contract that was ultimately agreed upon includes the
creation of a civilian oversight office and provides that the police department will no longer automatically downgrade short suspensions to confidential written reprimands.168 Also, the contract requires that
investigators have more time to investigate complaints that allege criminal conduct, and misconduct complaints can now be filed online.169
These were significant advances but did not come without dire warnings that “hundreds of officers would retire en masse if the council rejected the [original] contract.”170 The experience in Austin is a real-world
example that “the public must be able to evaluate the government’s decision as soon as possible—and, where possible and appropriate, in order
to allow public input and oversight before a final decision is made.”171
Efforts like the AJC’s demonstrate the importance of opening the process and centering stakeholders in justice reform efforts. Yet for that exercise to have legitimacy, it must “respect[ ] the leadership of community
players rather than including them as an afterthought.”172
VII. CONCLUSION
Police unions rose in power partially in response to the civil unrest in
urban neighborhoods in the 1960s.173 Since then, they have frequently
stood as obstacles to accountability-related reforms.174 The phenomenon
of over-criminalization and under-policing is an outgrowth of the aggressive policing strategies that emerged in the 1970s.175 Contracts that civilian policymakers negotiate with police unions shield officers from
accountability for misconduct and excessive force.176 This contributes not
just to undermining police legitimacy in communities that are already vulnerable to poverty, elevated crime, and limited services but also to an
estrangement, or separation, from the greater polity.177
The involvement of people from historically marginalized and over-policed communities in labor contract negotiations will unfortunately cause
organizations that have an interest in maintaining the current structure to
use scare tactics, such as the threat of mass officer retirements. Fear of
crime and disorder in urban neighborhoods has allowed for policing that
seeks to deemphasize the strict discipline of police officers who are ac166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
McMahon & Moore, supra note 163.
Fenster, supra note 119, at 940.
Sakala & La Vigne, supra note 158, at 255.
See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text.
See generally Soss & Weaver, supra note 22, at 569–73.
See supra notes 80–109 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 39–48 and accompanying text.
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cused of harming community members.178 Post-Ferguson, the media,
policymakers, and academics paid only moderate attention to the role of
police unions in use of force policies and accountability procedures.179
This new iteration of the Civil Rights Movement will “require a more
aggressive infusion of deliberative participation” that includes the very
people whose disenfranchisement from the public square is a major contributor to the sense of deep detachment in Black, Brown, and poor
communities.180

178. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
179. See McCormick, supra note 53, at 51–52.
180. Id.
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